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This paper examines the effect of regulations (i.e., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Regulation G) on 
both the timing of earnings announcements and their relative informational role. I find that after 
the regulation of earnings announcements was instituted, firms began issuing less timely earnings 
announcements and those announcements have become more important for shareholders. Ceteris 
paribus, after the regulations, firms have disclosed their fiscal year-end announcements more than 
four days later than they had prior to regulatory changes. My results are robust to sensitivity 
analyses which control for concurrent earnings announcement disclosures and other changes 
instituted by SOX. Further, I find evidence suggesting that the relative informational role of 
earnings announcements has increased significantly in the post-regulation period. This study 
highlights a shift in both the timeliness and investor perceptions of earnings announcements 







 This study examines the effect of new regulations on both the (1) timeliness and (2) relative 
informational role of quarterly earnings announcement press releases.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (U.S. 2002; “SOX” hereafter) directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or 
“the Commission” hereafter) to implement new regulations to standardize the disclosure of non-
GAAP earnings in earnings releases.  While many people assume it relates only to non-GAAP 
reporting, through Regulation G (SEC 2003; “Reg G” hereafter), the SEC has also assumed 
regulatory oversight for all earnings releases. Therefore, it has intensified its scrutiny of these 
important disclosures.1  Other aspects and outgrowths of SOX created additional pressure on 
auditors, including Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” hereafter) 
inspections and internal control evaluations.  My results indicate that, in the new regulatory 
environment created by SOX, firms have altered the timing of their earnings announcements, and 
investors perceive those announcements to be more informative.  In the broadest sense, this study 
provides evidence that instituting or increasing disclosure regulation likely induces significant 
changes on the part of preparers, auditors, and users with respect to public earnings disclosures.  
Further, the increase in the relative importance of earnings information is consistent with the intent 
of SEC oversight, while the decrease in timeliness appears to be an unintended consequence of 
the regulation unexplored in prior research.   
 I first examine the timing of earnings announcements using a sample of 105,771 firm-
quarter observations of 7,303 firms during the 1998 to 2008 sample period to investigate whether 
companies have altered the relative timeliness of their earnings announcements after the initiation 
of SEC oversight of this previously unregulated public disclosure.  Specifically, I test whether 
                                                 
1 Although the intent of the law is to limit aggressive non-GAAP reporting, the SEC now monitors all earnings 
announcements of all firms, not just those that include non-GAAP measures. 
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firms have changed the lag between their fiscal quarter-end dates and earnings announcement dates 
relative to the pre-regulation period.  Second, I use a pre- and post-regulation period matched 
sample to investigate whether regulation has changed the relative informational role of earnings 
announcements.  Specifically, I collect calendar-year and earnings announcement-window stock 
returns for a sample of 4,862 firms in the year before and the year after regulation became effective 
to measure the change in the relative informational role of quarterly earnings announcements using 
Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) method.   
I find evidence that companies take longer to announce their earnings after implementation 
of this regulation.  Specifically, I find that firms release fiscal fourth quarter earnings 
announcements 4.27 days later, on average, than they did prior to the initiation of this regulation, 
even after controlling for various firm characteristics.  This change in timeliness appears to be 
incremental to other earnings announcement timing alterations explored in prior research.  For 
example, Krishnan and Yang (2009) note a significant delay of 1.16 days when firms report a loss 
and Brown et al. (2012a) report that firms in their sample change their announcement timing by a 
statistically significant 0.27 days when they disclose non-GAAP earnings.  Additionally, I find 
that the decision to disclose non-GAAP earnings in the post-regulation period is not significantly 
associated with the change in earnings announcement timing.  Even though Reg G mandates a 
reconciliation of non-GAAP figures in earnings announcements, I do not find evidence that the 
change in earnings announcement timing that I document is related to the requirements about 
disclosing non-GAAP earnings per se (i.e., the non-GAAP reconciliation).   
Instead, the change in earnings announcement timeliness appears to be related to the 
institution and the strengthening of regulatory oversight through SOX.  I find additional evidence 
that other regulatory changes for auditors are also associated with the timing of management’s 
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earnings announcements.  Prior studies have identified consequences related to PCAOB 
regulations regarding the timing of the audit, which is closely associated with the timing of the 
earnings announcement (e.g., Bronson et al. 2011; Schroeder 2015; Marshall et al. 2017).  My 
results regarding the change in earnings announcement timing are robust to a series of sensitivity 
analyses that control for additional GAAP and non-GAAP earnings announcement disclosures, 
and other audit characteristics.  Taken together, my results indicate that the new mechanisms for 
monitoring earnings announcements, initiated by SOX, mark a regulatory regime change that has 
influenced the timing of earnings releases.   
I document evidence suggesting that the delay in the timing of earnings announcements 
overlaps with the creation of the PCAOB, the initiation of PCAOB inspections, and auditor internal 
control evaluations.  I provide additional evidence suggesting that year-end earnings 
announcements, which receive additional scrutiny from auditors, were incrementally delayed in 
the period immediately after Reg G became effective, but not in the immediate aftermath of SOX 
or when SOX Section 404 became effective.  Further, although new auditor regulations have 
changed the timing of the audit, without Reg G, managers would not have had direct incentive to 
alter the timing of their earnings announcements.  The combination of Reg G and the creation of 
the PCAOB provided managers and auditors, respectively, with incentives to ensure that earnings 
announcement disclosures do not contain material misstatements.   
I also examine whether the relative informational role of quarterly earnings announcements 
changed in the new regulatory regime using the abnormal R2 measure developed by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008).  The abnormal R2 measure captures the informational role of earnings 
announcements for shareholders relative to other information sources throughout the year, and I 
document evidence that the measure has increased significantly after the implementation of new 
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regulations.2  I find this result for both a large sample of firms as well as for a sample of 500 firms 
for which I hand-collect earnings announcement disclosures.  In summary, I find evidence that 
regulatory oversight has led to less-timely earnings announcements but that the increased scrutiny 
of earnings announcements has improved their informational role for investors.3 
 My results contribute to the existing literature in three key areas: (1) the consequences of 
disclosure and audit regulation, (2) earnings announcement timeliness, and (3) investor responses 
to earnings announcements.  Prior research that has specifically focused on Reg G has not 
considered the regulation’s impact on earnings announcement timing, and I provide evidence 
suggesting that the introduction and strengthening of regulatory oversight has reduced the 
timeliness of earnings announcements.4  Other recent research either tangentially mentions delays 
in earning announcements during this time (Bronson et al. 2011; Schroeder 2015) without positing 
why or states that earnings announcement timing did not change during this time (Marshall et al. 
2017).  Finally, my results extend prior research on investor responses to earnings announcements 
by providing evidence that the increase in the relative informational role of earnings 
announcements documented in prior research (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Basu et al. 2013) can 
be partially attributed to the regulations.  This study sheds light on some of the unintended 
consequences of disclosure regulation that should interest earnings announcement preparers, users 
                                                 
2 Other prior research has examined the effect of Reg G on earnings response coefficients (ERC), which captures 
investor response to one figure disclosed in the earnings announcement (e.g., Marques 2006; Black et al. 2012). The 
abnormal R2 measure captures the importance of the earnings announcement, including all disclosures, relative to all 
other sources of information throughout the year.  
3 Both Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Basu et al. (2013) document evidence of a marked and sustained increase in 
the abnormal R2 measure during the 2003 – 2004 period. My results indicate that regulation indeed played a role in 
the documented increase in the relative informational role of quarterly earnings announcements. 
4 A host of prior studies provide evidence suggesting that firm-specific earnings announcement delays are 
interpreted as bad news by investors (e.g., Givoly and Palmon 1982; Chambers and Penman 1984; Kross and 
Schroeder 1984; Begley and Fischer 1998; Schroeder 2015; Johnson and So 2017), but these studies do not consider 
market-wide earnings announcement timeliness changes in response to regulatory changes. 
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and auditors.  Additionally, my results should be of interest to policymakers interested in 
evaluating the ramifications of their actions on an important vehicle for financial reporting. 
2. Background 
Background on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Regulation G and the PCAOB 
 Before SOX, the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings in earnings announcements had 
become increasingly more common and these disclosures had assumed an important role in stock 
market pricing (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003).  At the same time, business 
media, academics, and regulators had become increasingly skeptical about non-GAAP earnings 
quality (Levitt 1998; Doyle et al. 2003; Weill 2003).5  SOX Section 401(b) instructed the SEC to 
create new rules governing “pro forma” information disclosed in companies’ earnings press 
releases and the SEC issued Final Rule 33-8176 on January 22, 2003 to fulfill this mandate (U.S. 
2002).6   
 Reg G requires firms to furnish all earnings announcements, not just those that disclose 
non-GAAP measures, starting March 28, 2003 to the SEC in a Form 8-K.  The Form 8-K 
requirement established the SEC as the collector and monitor for all earnings announcement 
disclosures, not just those that include non-GAAP disclosures.  As required by SOX, Reg G 
compels firms that disclose non-GAAP measures to reconcile them to the “most directly 
comparable GAAP financial measure” (U.S. 2002; SEC 2003).  Most prior studies of Reg G focus 
on the non-GAAP reconciliation requirement (e.g., Marques 2006, Heflin and Hsu 2008; Zhang 
and Zheng 2011, etc.).  I argue that the institution of SEC oversight, through the Form 8-K 
                                                 
5 Some contemporary empirical evidence finds that non-GAAP earnings are not disclosed opportunistically. For 
example, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that non-GAAP earnings are more informative and persistent than GAAP 
earnings. They find that non-GAAP disclosers tend to be loss firms and firms in service and high tech industries. 
6 Refer to SEC Proposed Rule 33-8145 at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8145.htm and SEC Final Rule 33-
8176 at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8176.htm. 
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requirement, had broader implications for the disclosure environment since it affected all earnings 
announcements, both those with and those without non-GAAP measures.  While SOX created a 
host of other regulations and oversight mechanisms, without Reg G, none of these other regulatory 
changes, by themselves, likely would have influenced how and when management discloses 
earnings announcements. 
At the same time, Title I of SOX created the PCAOB and established its authority over 
audits of SEC registrants. Section 104 of SOX directed the PCAOB to inspect public company 
audits and Section 404(b) required public accounting firms to attest to management’s assessment 
of the company’s internal controls over financial reporting.  Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS 2), the 
first substantive auditing standard issued by the PCAOB, redefined the auditor’s role in evaluating 
their client’s internal controls and increased the amount of time necessary to complete the year-
end financial statement audit for accelerated filers (Bronson et al. 2011; Schroeder 2015; Marshall 
et al. 2017).  Additionally, the PCAOB began inspecting audits in June of 2003, as directed by 
Section 104 of SOX.  Public accounting firms understood that the PCAOB inspectors would focus 
the initial inspections on 2002 fiscal year audits, which coincides with the first year-end earnings 
announcements subject to the Form 8-K requirement.  Each of these aspects of the regulation 
increased pressure on auditors to produce higher quality audits. 
Instituting Regulatory Oversight 
 Although earnings releases had always been subject to private litigation, before Reg G no 
central repository existed for the announcements and no regulatory body oversaw their content.  
Companies, their legal counsel, and auditors understood that regulation would afford the SEC the 
ability to monitor all earnings announcements and ensure that their disclosures agreed with the 
corresponding 10-Q and 10-K filings.  Further, auditors understood that the PCAOB would review 
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their audit documentation and potentially interview engagement team members during their 
inspections.   
In response to the new regulation, preparers weigh the costs and benefits of disclosure to 
determine whether to alter either the timing or content of their earnings releases.  Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) assert that regulation imposes both direct (e.g., resources and time devoted to 
fulfilling the regulations requirements) and indirect (e.g., changes in behavior to avoid punishment 
under the regulation) costs on firms and earnings announcement regulation is no different.  
Conversely, any expected benefits of the new regulation would likely be enjoyed by market 
participants.  This study investigates whether firms have altered the timing of their earnings 
announcements and if investor perceptions of the regulated disclosure mechanism have changed 
in response to the regulation. 
Responses to the Regulation 
 In implementing the regulation’s requirements, companies make critical choices regarding 
their earnings announcement timing and disclosures.7  On the one hand, companies and auditors 
may have exerted greater effort to verify their announcement disclosures, incurring the indirect 
costs of regulation (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  As a result, managers may have delayed the 
announcements in the new regulatory environment to allow time to review the figures more 
thoroughly and ensure that the earnings releases are free of errors before their disclosure.8  
Alternatively, companies have incentives to maintain or accelerate the timeliness of their earnings 
releases (Johnson and So 2017; Evans 2016).  Investors may have interpreted an earnings 
announcement delay potentially either as a signal that earnings announcements, prior to regulation, 
                                                 
7 The New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ and the American Stock Exchange all require traded firms to make 
earnings releases, so companies with traded stock could not elect to stop making earnings announcements altogether. 
8 This likelihood was noted in PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP in their comment letter regarding Reg G dated 
December 13, 2002 (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74302/pricewater1.htm). 
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were of dubious quality or as an indication of contemporaneous “bad news” (Chambers and 
Penman 1984; Begley and Fischer 1998; Johnson and So 2017).  This study examines how 
companies have responded to the regulations via their earnings announcement timing. Whereas 
other recent studies have examined factors associated with earnings announcement timeliness 
(e.g., Sengupta 2004; Krishnan and Yang 2009; Bronson et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2012a), this 
study investigates whether regulatory intervention could induce firms to alter the timing of their 
quarterly earnings announcements and the impact this may have on investor perceptions.9   
In a recent study, Brown et al. (2012a) document evidence that managers opportunistically 
accelerate the timing of non-GAAP earnings announcements. Related to this study, they provide 
statistics indicating an increase in the delay in earnings announcement timing after SOX and that 
the change in the delay for earnings announcements containing non-GAAP earnings disclosures is 
not significantly different from the delay in quarters not containing non-GAAP performance 
metrics.10  A key difference between Brown et al.’s (2012a) setting and mine is that they investigate 
managerial motivations for altering the timing of non-GAAP disclosures, whereas I document 
evidence of a general regulation-induced change in earnings announcements timing.  In light of 
Brown et al.’s (2012a) results, I control for the disclosure of non-GAAP metrics when testing the 
timing of all earnings announcements. 
 The regulation of quarterly earnings announcements has also potentially altered their 
informational role for investors.  Prior studies have examined investor responses to the 
reconciliation of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings mandated by Reg G (Zhang and Zheng 2011) 
                                                 
9 A number of prior studies have thoroughly documented the regulation’s effect on the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings (e.g., Marques 2006; Heflin and Hsu 2008; Kolev et al. 2008; Black et al. 2012, etc.) and this study does 
not directly investigate this phenomenon. 
10 Brown et al. (2012a) refer to the fact that “heightened regulatory scrutiny may have led to an increase in reporting 




and the change in market reactions to earnings news around Reg G (Marques 2006; Heflin and 
Hsu 2008; Black et al. 2012), but their conclusions about Reg G’s effect on the perceived reliability 
of earnings announcements are mixed.  Further, no prior study has examined the change in the 
relative informational role of quarterly earnings announcements around this regulation.  I examine 
the change in the relative informational role of quarterly earnings announcements to gauge whether 
investor perceptions of earnings releases change after the institution of regulatory oversight. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing 
 The new regulations may give companies the sense that they are under greater scrutiny, 
which potentially could induce them to delay their announcements to attain greater assurance that 
their disclosures are correct.  However, firms typically maintain their earnings announcement 
schedule due to market demand and the potential costs of reducing the timeliness of releases 
(Bronson et al. 2011; Johnson and So 2017).  Firms that release their earnings later may signal to 
investors that their earnings are of lower quality.  Further, recent research has identified evidence 
suggesting that delayed earnings announcements suffer from lower abnormal stock returns, lower 
abnormal trading volume, and abnormal stock price volatility, indicating lower information 
content (Schroeder 2015; Marshall et al. 2017).11 Still other research has provided evidence that 
the timely disclosure of balance sheet information in earnings announcements is associated with a 
lower cost of capital, on average (Evans 2016).  Conversely, with additional time prior to the 
announcement, companies (with the help of their auditors) could ensure that all of the information 
disclosed as part of the announcement is free of material misstatements, thereby decreasing the 
                                                 
11 In another concurrent working paper, Johnson and So (2017) present evidence that the stocks of earnings 
announcement delayers underperform early announcers by more than 2.5% in the subsequent month. 
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possibility of having to restate any of the information disclosed at a later date.  Restatements 
require the firm to file an amended earnings announcement (on Form 8-K/A), which is associated 
with negative market reactions (Hollie et al. 2005, 2012; Bronson et al. 2011).  Given these 
possibilities, I first test for a change in the timeliness of earnings announcements after regulation.  
My first hypothesis, stated in the null form, is as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. After the adoption of earnings announcement regulation, there is 
no change in the lag between fiscal quarter-end and the earnings 
announcement date. 
 
 I also examine whether any change in the reporting lag following the enactment of the 
regulations is greater for the year-end (fiscal fourth quarter) announcements than for the other three 
quarters (interim) announcements.  The fiscal year-end disclosures are included in the audited 
annual report and, as such, are the only earnings announcements that include audited GAAP 
disclosures (Chambers and Penman 1984; Bronson et al. 2011; Marshall et al. 2017).  If regulatory 
oversight induced auditors to increase their effort for the year-end audit, then I expect that the 
change in the reporting lag for the fiscal year-end announcements would be greater than for interim 
announcements (Schroeder 2015).  I attribute incremental change in the timing of the year-end 
earnings announcement to either the increased disclosures in the announcement or the presence of 
the external auditors and test for this in the fiscal year-end relative to the other three fiscal quarters.  
I state my second hypothesis in the null form as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. After the adoption of earnings announcement regulation, there is 
no difference in the change in reporting lag for the fiscal fourth quarter 
compared to the other three fiscal quarters. 
 
Changes in the Relative Informational Role of Earnings Announcements 
 For my third test, I investigate whether quarterly earnings announcements provide more 
information to investors, relative to other information sources during the year in the post-regulation 
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environment.  After assuming the regulatory oversight of earnings announcements, the SEC 
potentially assures investors that these announcements are of higher quality.  If investor responses 
to earnings announcements do not change following regulation, then this evidence would suggest 
that SEC oversight has not influenced investor perceptions of the earnings announcement quality.  
Conversely, if market reactions decrease following regulation of earnings announcements, then 
this evidence would suggest that investors believe the quality of the announcements has decreased 
after regulation.12  
 Ball and Shivakumar (2008) develop a measure (abnormal R2) that captures the 
informational role of earnings announcements in the stock market compared to all other sources 
of information during the year.  Their measure captures the variation of a firm’s annual returns 
explained by the variation in the short-window returns around its quarterly earnings 
announcements.13  Abnormal R2 measure provides a readily-interpretable measure of earnings 
announcements’ relative informational importance for investors (i.e., the proportion of annual 
firm-specific information captured in quarterly earnings announcements). 
Regulation may have increased (not unchanged) the relative informational role of quarterly 
earnings announcements if investors perceive that the earnings announcements (do not) provide 
higher quality disclosures when overseen by the SEC.  Therefore, I state my third hypotheses in 
the null form, as follows: 
                                                 
12 Investors may view earnings announcements to be relatively less informative after regulation possibly due to the 
change in announcement timeliness or if other forms of disclosure (e.g., annual report filings, management forecasts, 
dividend announcements, mergers, changes in management or the board of directors, etc.) take on greater 
importance during the sample period. 
13 Basu et al. (2013) point out that the Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) measure is simply an adaption of Beaver’s 
(1968) approach of attempting to measure the increase in return variance around the quarterly earnings 
announcements.  Basu et al. (2013) also assert that variance-based approaches do not depend on assumptions 
regarding market earnings expectations (e.g., past earnings, analyst forecasts, etc.) and are fundamentally different 
than the ERC-based approach used in other studies (Marques 2006; Heflin and Hsu 2008; Black et al. 2012). 
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HYPOTHESIS 3. The relative informational role of quarterly earnings 
announcements did not change after instituting SEC regulation. 
4. Sample Selection 
Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing Sample 
To test the earnings announcement timing hypotheses (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2), I 
create a sample using Compustat and I/B/E/S data over the 11-year period from 1998 through 2008 
as described in panel A of Table 1.14  I begin with an initial sample of 481,961 firm-quarter 
observations over this time period from the Compustat database.  Since the timing tests depend on 
the Compustat variable for the report date of quarterly earnings (RDQ), I eliminate any 
observations where the Compustat earnings announcement date is missing (91,986 observations).  
I also delete any observations with obvious earnings announcement date errors (5,307 
observations15) providing a sample of 384,668 observations for 15,673 firms with available dates 
for the fiscal period end and the quarterly earnings announcements.  I also require a number of 
data items from Compustat Quarterly for the multivariate tests and eliminate observations with 
missing data for these variables (178,282 observations).  I then merge the Compustat Quarterly 
data with analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S and eliminate observations that are missing I/B/E/S 
data (100,615 observations).16  I also require sample firms to have at least two analyst forecasts 
made less than 30 days before the earnings announcement date.  This process provides a final 
                                                 
14 I also conduct my analyses from Tables 2 through 4 on a sample of 94,628 firm-year observations in a balanced 
calendar timeframe from March 27, 1999 through March 27, 2007. The results are qualitatively similar and 
inferences are unchanged. 
15 Obvious earnings announcement date errors include an RDQ that falls before the fiscal period end date or is more 
than 180 days after the fiscal period end date (i.e., two fiscal quarters later).   
16 I also delete observations where the earnings announcement date does not match between I/B/E/S and Compustat.  
This accounts for the deletion of 2,876 observations.  I also perform the earnings announcement timing tests 
separately including these observations alternately using the Compustat and I/B/E/S date as the ‘true’ earnings 
announcement date.  My results and inferences are not sensitive to their exclusion. 
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sample of 105,771 quarterly earnings announcement observations for 7,303 firms, which I use in 
my earnings announcement timing tests (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2). 
Changes in the Relative Informational Role of Earnings Announcement (abnormal R2)  
 I begin with the sample of firms with earnings announcements from March 28, 2002 
through March 27, 2004 to create the sample of observations that I use to test for a change in the 
relative informational role of earnings announcements following the effective date of regulatory 
oversight (Hypothesis 3) as described in panel B of Table 1.  To be included, I require that the firm 
have eight earnings announcements in the testing time period: four before March 28, 2003 (the 
pre-regulation period) and four after that date (the post-regulation period), producing a sample of 
4,986 firms.  I eliminate any observations that have less than 100 trading days of stock return data 
in either the pre- or post-regulation period on CRSP, eliminating 124 firms.  This process provides 
a final usable sample of 9,724 firm-year observations (4,862 firms with one pre- and one post-
regulation observation), which I use to test for a change in the relative informational role of 
earnings announcements between the pre- and the post-regulation periods.  
5. Study Design 
Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing Study Design 
 To examine the changes in earnings announcement timing and test Hypotheses 1 and 
Hypothesis 2, I utilize the following OLS regression model, which is based on prior studies 
examining earnings announcement reporting lags and disclosure decisions (e.g., Givoly and 
Palmon 1982; Chambers and Penman 1984; Sengupta 2004; Heflin and Hsu 2008).17 
                                                 




𝐿𝑎𝑔 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 + 𝛼2𝑃𝐹 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝑃𝐹 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑






𝜀,                                                    (1) 
The dependent variable, Lag, is the number of calendar days between the fiscal period-end date 
and the quarterly earnings announcement date.18   
My variables of interest are RegG, NG, Yearend and the interaction variables.  RegG is an 
indicator variable that equals one for all earnings announcements made on or after March 28, 2003, 
zero otherwise. NG is an indicator variable that equals one if the actual earnings in I/B/E/S do not 
equal GAAP earnings per share in Compustat, zero otherwise (Kolev et al. 2008).19 Yearend is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the earnings announcement is for the fiscal fourth quarter, zero 
otherwise.20 
The control variables include Sales, Inventory, Surprise, Miss, HiTech, Intangible, Special, 
MTB, MandA, Loss, Leverage, and Bath.  Sales is the natural logarithm of quarterly net sales 
revenue.  Inventory is the ratio of inventory to total assets.21  I calculate Surprise as the difference 
between the actual quarterly earnings (I/B/E/S) and the median analyst split-unadjusted forecast 
                                                 
18 I substitute the logarithmic transformation of Lag (logLag), the abnormal Lag (Delay, calculated as the current 
firm-quarter lag less the corresponding firm-quarter lag from the previous fiscal year as in Brown et al. 2012), and 
Lag scaled by the SEC-required filing deadline as alternative dependent variables in all timing regressions in order 
to test the robustness of my results. The results for the alternate specifications are qualitatively similar to the main 
results, except as noted. 
19 The independent variable NG is simply a proxy for the disclosure of street earnings used extensively in prior 
research (e.g., Kolev et al. 2008) and is not identical to the hand-collected non-GAAP earnings disclosure variable, 
PR, described later, and used in other research (e.g., Black et al. 2012). Additionally, Bentley et al. (2016) had 
identified the frequency at which the proxies used in prior literature likely diverge form the actual management 
disclosures. As the content of earnings announcements is not the primary focus of this study, I rely on the proxy 
most widely used in the published literature. 
20 I utilize the operator (×) to indicate an interaction of the two variables adjoined by the operator. For example, 
‘RegG × NG’ is an interaction of the RegG and NG variables.  
21 The requirement that firms disclose Inventory reduces the sample size. To address the concern that my results are 
skewed by the Inventory requirement I also execute the main regression analyses including an indicator variable that 
equals one if Inventory is missing from the dataset, and zero otherwise. The main results (untabulated) are 
qualitatively similar with this change. 
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estimate (I/B/E/S) scaled by the end of firm-quarter stock price.22  By using earnings forecast 
information from I/B/E/S, Surprise captures the earnings news contained in the earnings 
announcement (Collins et al. 2009).  Miss is an indicator variable that equals one if Surprise is 
negative, and zero otherwise.  HiTech is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a 
member of a high-tech industry, and zero otherwise.  Intangible equals total non-current assets 
other than property, plant and equipment.  SI is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
reports a special item in the quarter, and zero otherwise.  MTB is the ratio of the firm’s market 
value of equity to its book value of shareholders’ equity.  MandA is in indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm discloses nonzero merger and acquisition activities during the quarter, and zero 
otherwise.  Loss is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s GAAP earnings are less than 
zero in the current quarter, and zero otherwise.  Leverage is the firm’s total liabilities divided by 
its book value of shareholders’ equity.  Bath is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
reports both a negative special item and negative earnings in the quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Additionally, the model includes indicator variables for the fiscal years from 1999 to 2008 to 
control for time fixed-effects. 
 To test Hypothesis 1, I include the variable RegG, which captures the incremental Lag for 
observations after the adoption of earnings announcement regulation.  If companies take longer to 
prepare their fiscal earnings announcements after as compared to before regulation, then I would 
expect to find that 
1 > 0.  Brown et al. (2012a) provide evidence that companies strategically time 
their earnings announcements that disclose non-GAAP earnings, and I include RegG × NG to 
capture the incremental association between non-GAAP earnings and Lag after regulation and the 
required reconciliation of non-GAAP to GAAP earnings in earnings announcements.  I include 
                                                 
22 Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) scale their forecast error measure by the stock price during the final month of the 
quarter to facilitate cross-sectional analysis and I follow that convention here. 
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RegG × Year-end to test whether the regulations affected the reporting lag for fiscal year-end 
earnings announcements more than the reporting lag for the other three fiscal quarters (Hypothesis 
2).  I do not make a prediction for 5 , but expect that 4 > 0 because prior research has found that 
the reporting Lag for the fiscal year-end earnings announcements is greater than for the first three 
fiscal quarters (Chambers and Penman 1984).  The variables Sales, Inventory, Surprise, Miss, 
HiTech, Intangible, Special, MTB, MandA, Loss, Leverage, and Bath control for firm 
characteristics that prior research finds to have a significant relationship with earnings 
announcement lags or the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings (e.g., Givoly and Palmon 
1982; Chambers and Penman 1984; Sengupta 2004; Heflin and Hsu 2008).   
Changes in the Relative Informational Role of Earnings Announcements Study Design 
 To examine the change in the relative informational role of quarterly earnings 
announcements following regulation (Hypothesis 3), I utilize the following regression developed 
by Ball and Shivakumar (2008). 
𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤1) + 𝜃2𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤2) + 𝜃3𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤3)
+ 𝜃4𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤4) + 𝜀,                                                                          (3) 
I estimate annual cross-sectional regressions of firms’ calendar-year returns on returns for the four 
quarterly earnings announcement windows for March 28, 2002 through March 27, 2003 (the pre-
regulation period) and March 28, 2003 through March 27, 2004 (the post-regulation period).23  The 
adjusted R2 from these regressions provides the proportion of the annual return variation associated 
with the four earnings announcement windows.  To benchmark the adjusted R2 from Equation (3) 
against normal stock price volatility, I calculate abnormal R2 as the difference between the 
                                                 
23 I calculate returns as the three-day (t = -1, 0, +1) abnormal returns compared to an equal-weighted index but raw 
returns and abnormal returns based on a value-weighted index, the S&P 500 index and decile-ranked size-adjusted 
returns were also executed as a robustness check.  The inferences remain unchanged using the different 
specifications for all tests. 
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estimated adjusted R2 and the expected adjusted R2 under the assumption that daily returns are i.i.d. 
across time.  For the pre-regulation (post-regulation) period there were 251 (252) trading days, 
providing an adjustment of approximately 4.78% (4.76%) to arrive at the abnormal R2.  The 
abnormal R2 provides a measure of the proportion of annual return information captured by the 
four quarterly earnings announcements.  To examine the change in the informational role of 
quarterly earnings announcements for annual returns for a sample of matched firms between the 
pre- and the post-regulation periods, I calculate the abnormal R2 measure for both sample periods 
and compare the two. 
6. Results 
Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing Results 
Full Sample 
 1. Summary Statistics, Univariate Results and Correlations.  I present summary 
statistics and the results of univariate tests for the sample in panel A of Table 2. The summary 
statistics tables present the mean, median, 25th and 75th percentile figures for the dependent 
variable Lag and the explanatory variables for Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Sales, Inventory, Surprise, 
Miss, HiTech, Intangible, Special, MTB, MandA, Loss, Leverage, and Bath).  The results indicate 
that sample firms wait an average (median) of 31.11 (28) days after the fiscal period-end date to 
release their quarterly earnings announcements.  Overall, firm-quarter observations have an 
average (median) of approximately 9% (3%) of their assets in inventory and approximately 30% 
of the observations experience negative earnings surprises.  On average, 27% of the observations 
are from high-tech firms, 34% disclose special items, 24% disclose a GAAP earnings loss while 
10% exhibit “big bath” behavior.  The univariate results with respect to the regulation’s effect on 
earnings announcement timing indicate that overall the average firm-quarter observation Lag 
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significantly increased by 4.42 days after regulation (p < 0.01).  The results also indicate a decrease 
in the incidence of non-GAAP reporting in the post-regulation period while missing earnings 
targets is more likely but losses are less likely while earnings surprises are greater after regulation.   
Panel B of Table 2 presents Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the variables 
used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2.  The results indicate significant correlations between Lag and all 
of the explanatory variables.  RegG, NG, Year-end, Miss, HiTech, Intangible, Special, Loss and 
Bath are positively correlated with Lag, while Sales, Inventory, Surprise, MTB, MandA, and 
Leverage are all negatively correlated with Lag (p < 0.01).  RegG is negatively correlated with NG 
(p < 0.01).24 
Panel C of Table 2 presents the mean and median statistics as well as the number of 
observations of Lag for each fiscal year in the sample.  I observe an increase in Lag for both the 
year-end and other quarters during fiscal 2003, which is not simply a one-time jump that reverts 
later.  The median lag for year-end (quarterly) earnings announcements grew from 36 (24) in 2001 
to 45 (31) in 2007, implying that companies were taking a week longer to make their 
announcements.  In Figure 1, I present a histogram that compares the pre- and post-Reg G periods 
average number of days that lapse between the fiscal period-end date and the date of the earnings 
announcement for both the fiscal year-end separately from the other three quarters. The average 
number of days increases by 6 (3.7) days for fiscal year-end (interim) from the pre-Reg G to the 
post-Reg G period.  Figure 1 identifies the effective date of Reg G as an inflection point in the 
timing of earnings announcements. 
2. Multivariate Results.  Table 3 presents the results from examining regulation’s effect 
on Lag using OLS with heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors (White 1980) clustered by 
                                                 
24 Results using three alternate dates for RegG (July 30, 2002; November 27, 2002; January 16, 2003) are 
qualitatively similar to the results presented for all tests and inferences remain unchanged.  
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firm and Yearend.  Table 3 presents the results from estimating Model 1, which does not include 
the independent variable RegG and serves as a benchmark for all other regressions.  I find that the 
coefficient estimate for NG is significantly positive, indicating that earnings announcements 
containing non-GAAP disclosures come approximately 0.73 days later than those that do not (p < 
0.01).25   
Table 3 also presents the results for Models 2 and 3, which include the indicator variable 
that captures the change in timeliness in the post-regulation period.  The coefficient estimate on 
RegG is significantly positive (
1  = 2.39; p < 0.01) in Model 2, providing multivariate evidence 
suggesting that the amount of time between the fiscal period-end and earnings announcements 
lengthened after regulation (H1).26   For Model 3, I find that the coefficients on both the interaction 
term RegG × Year-end ( 5 = 2.56; p < 0.01) and RegG ( 1 = 1.71; p < 0.01) are significantly 
positive, indicating that fiscal year-end announcements are delayed by approximately 4.27 days (
1 + 5 ) and other quarters by almost two days ( 1 ) after regulation (Hypotheses 1 and 2).  This 
four-day increase in the reporting lag appears large relative to the results of prior studies of the 
determinants of firms' reporting lags.  For example, Krishnan and Yang (2009) find that reporting 
a loss, on average, significantly adds 1.16 days to the earnings announcement lag. 
I also find that the coefficient on the RegG × NG interaction term is not statistically 
significant, indicating that the regulations had no incremental effect on earnings announcement 
                                                 
25 These results agree with those of Brown et al. (2012a), who find that earnings announcements that disclose non-
GAAP earnings are made than in earnings announcements that do not. Their measure of earnings announcement 
timing is constructed as the difference between the current Lag and the Lag in the corresponding quarter of the prior 
year and uses within-sample (longitudinal) tests of managerial disclosure incentives. Using Delay I find a marginal 
negative coefficient on NG, similar to Brown et al. (2012a), which does not affect my inferences about the 
regulation’s cross-sectional effect on earnings announcement timing.  
26 In other analyses (untabulated) I define RegG, using the enactment date of SOX (July 30, 2002), the date of the 
proposed rule (November 27, 2002) and the date of the final rule (January 16, 2003). Results are qualitatively 
unchanged from those presented here. 
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timing for non-GAAP disclosures compared to only GAAP disclosures.  Further, the increase in 
the reporting Lag in the post-regulation period is not confined to those firms that disclose non-
GAAP earnings.  This result suggests that the overall increase in Lag after regulation cannot be 
fully explained by non-GAAP disclosures and that firms did not require additional time to prepare 
the Reg G-mandated reconciliation of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings.  Brown et al. (2012a) 
presents similar evidence. They find that while all firms delayed their earnings announcements 
after regulation, non-GAAP disclosers delay less than GAAP disclosers.  The other explanatory 
variables maintain their signs and significance in Model 2 and Model 3. 
Including Other SOX Timeframes 
I execute additional tests in an attempt to identify the effect of regulation on earnings 
announcement timing separate from other components of SOX because Reg G’s effective date fell 
near other important SOX dates.  SOX instituted numerous regulatory changes for management, 
boards of directors and auditors, but only Reg G explicitly focuses on earnings announcements.  
Specifically, SOX Section 302 requires the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer 
for issuers to certify their financial statements, and Section 404 requires management and auditors 
of accelerated filers to assess the company’s internal controls.  Additionally, the PCAOB began 
inspections issuer audits in June 2003.  While these events do not directly affect the earnings 
announcement process, they could potentially influence managerial and auditor behavior in a way 
that would alter the timing of earnings announcement releases as a secondary effect. 
For these tests, I alter Equation 1 from Table 3 by eliminating RegG and constructing three 
new timeframe indicator variables: SOX, RegG1, and SOX404.  SOX equals one if the earnings 
announcement date is after SOX’s enactment date (July 30, 2002) but before the Reg G’s effective 
date (March 28, 2003), and zero otherwise.  RegG1 equals one if the earnings announcement date 
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is after Reg G’s effective date but before the effective date of SOX Section 404 for accelerated 
filers (November 30, 2004), and zero otherwise.27  SOX404 equals one if the earnings 
announcement date is after the effective date for SOX Section 404 for accelerated filers (November 
30, 2004), and zero otherwise.  I present the results from these tests in Table 4, for which I restrict 
the sample period to earnings announcements made between May 31, 2001 and January 31, 2006, 
that includes 59,382 observations with the requisite data.28 
 The results in Table 4 indicate that earnings announcement timing changed significantly 
during the three Sarbanes-Oxley windows.  In Model 1 SOX, RegG1, and SOX404 all have positive 
and significant associations with Lag (β1 = 2.67; β2 = 5.07; β3 = 9.83, respectively in Model 1; all 
p < 0.01).  The growth in Lag that began with the enactment of SOX, increased after both Reg G 
and Section 404 took effect.  In Model 2, I investigate whether year-end earnings announcements, 
which receive higher scrutiny from the external auditors, demonstrated timing differences 
incremental to those of the other fiscal quarters.  Again, the coefficient estimates for SOX, RegG1, 
and SOX404 remain positive and significant (all p < 0.01), indicating that earnings announcements 
for fiscal quarters one through three were delayed in all three timeframes measured.  For fiscal 
year-end earnings announcements, only those made during the RegG1 period were made 
significantly (p < 0.01) later than the other quarters in the contemporaneous period.  Year-end 
earnings announcements made during the initial SOX period were not made with significantly 
different timing, while those made during the SOX404 period were made significantly earlier (p < 
0.01) than the other three fiscal quarters. 
                                                 
27 Please note that PCAOB inspections began at public accounting firms in June 2003, which overlaps with the 
RegG1 timeframe.  
28 I limit the earnings announcement dates to be between May 31, 2001 and January 31, 2006 to have fourteen 
months in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley and post-Section 404 periods.  The SOX period includes approximately eight 
months of observations while the RegG1 period includes approximately twenty months of observations. 
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Taken together, these results indicate that management delayed earnings announcements 
during all three phases of SOX regulations.  Even though SOX initiated major changes for auditors 
in stages, only the period after Reg G resulted in a significant delay for earnings announcements 
that receive the most auditor scrutiny.  I interpret these results as an indication that although 
auditors play a role in the earnings announcement process, managers do not respond solely to the 
concerns of auditors when they schedule their earnings announcements resulting in delays that do 
not match audit delays (Bronson et al. 2011; Schroeder 2015; Marshall et al. 2017). 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 Earnings announcement regulation coincided with numerous other regulatory, financial 
reporting, corporate governance, and capital market changes.  To ensure that the change in earnings 
announcement timing results I uncover can be attributed to their regulation and not to other 
contemporaneous changes, I conduct a series of sensitivity analyses. 
1. Hand-Collected Sample. Prior research indicates that the amount and type of 
information disclosed in earnings announcements has changed over time (e.g., Chen et al. 2002; 
Francis et al. 2002; Kolev et al. 2008; Collins et al. 2009; Schroeder 2015).  To ensure that the 
changes in timeliness are not attributable to the contemporaneous changes in the content of 
earnings announcement disclosures, I perform a series of additional tests.  First, I hand-collect a 
sample of disclosures in 2,000 earnings announcements made by 500 randomly-selected firms in 
the quarters immediately before and after Reg G’s effective date (March 28, 2003).  To examine 
whether the change in earnings announcement timing in the years immediately before and after 
regulation I document is dependent on the disclosure content of the earnings announcement, I 
supplement Equation (1) with disclosure variables taken from the hand-collected earnings 
announcements.    
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In this model, I no longer use a proxy for the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, but instead 
include an indicator variable (PR) that captures the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings in the 
announcement (Bentley et al. 2016).  I also include the PR × RegG term to estimate the change in 
earnings announcement timing post-regulation for non-GAAP earnings announcements.  I also 
include indicator variables that equal one if the earnings announcement discloses a detailed income 
statement, balance sheet or statement of cash flows, and zero otherwise (IS, BS, and CF, 
respectively).   
In panel A of Table 5 I present the results of regulation’s effect on Lag using the data 
from the hand-collected sample.  In three of the five models, RegG has a significantly positive 
coefficient estimate, providing further multivariate evidence that the amount of time between the 
fiscal period-end and earnings announcements lengthened after regulation (H1).29  Additionally, 
in all five models the coefficients for the control variables maintain their direction and 
significance (p < 0.05 for all models and variables).  Of the disclosure variables, only the 
coefficient estimate for CF (𝜃7; p < 0.01) is significantly associated with Lag, and none of the 
interactions with RegG carries significant coefficient estimates.  These results indicate that 
regulation’s effect on earnings announcement timing is independent of the disclosures of non-
GAAP earnings and additional GAAP financial statements in the quarterly earnings 
announcement. 
2. Including Audit Data.  Bronson et al. (2011) find evidence suggesting that PCAOB 
auditing standards delayed audit completion, extending the amount of time between the fiscal year-
end date and the audit report date.  They also find that earnings announcements made prior to the 
                                                 
29 The coefficient estimate for 𝜃2is not significantly different than zero in any model of Table 5, Panel A. This result 




audit report date are more likely to be restated and are, therefore, of lower quality.  Schroeder 
(2015) also finds that companies releasing their earnings announcements after the financial 
statement audit is complete include more GAAP disclosures in their announcements. Marshall et 
al. (2017) presents evidence that after PCAOB AS 2/3, firms made more earnings announcements 
before the audit was completed.  They also find evidence suggesting that investors placed more 
reliance on earnings announcements with a completed audit.  To ensure that the earnings 
announcement timing results are not attributable to these and other audit characteristics, I 
supplement Equation (1) with additional control variables related to the audit.30  I include an 
indicator variable that equals one if the audit opinion is provided by a large audit firm (BIG5), and 
zero otherwise; an indicator variable for an earnings announcement corresponding to a year in 
which the firm receives a going concern modification (GC), and zero otherwise; and an indicator 
variable that equals one if the earnings announcement date is before the audit opinion date 
(NotAudited), and zero otherwise.31  I present results from these tests in panel B of Table 5. 
 These additional tests provide evidence that the effect of regulation on earnings 
announcement timing is robust to controlling for audit characteristics with the coefficient estimate 
for RegG significantly positive in all models (p < 0.01). Further, companies audited by Big 5 
auditors make their fiscal year-end earnings announcements significantly earlier than others (𝜔5 = 
-2.83; p < 0.01 from Model 3), but firms that receive going concern modifications make their year-
end earnings announcements significantly later (𝜔6 = 13.38; p < 0.01 from Model 3).  Finally, 
firms that make their earnings announcement prior to the audit report date make their 
                                                 
30 Bronson et al. (2011) and Schroeder (2015) but present statistics that earnings announcements lags and audit 
report lags grew during the sample period that I study but that they did not increase proportionately. Bronson et al. 
(2011) present evidence of a substantial decrease in the percentage of firms that waited until the audit was complete 
to issue their earnings announcements, while Schroeder (2015) presents statistics suggesting that both earnings 
announcement and audit report lags were growing at this time, audit report lags were growing much faster.  
31 All observations for these tests are fiscal year-end observations because only these relate to audit opinions.  
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announcement significantly earlier than other firms (𝜔7 = -8.91; p < 0.01 from Model 3).  
Coefficient estimate for 𝜔7 highlights a key difference in earnings announcement and audit report 
timing and provides evidence that the two do not move in tandem. 
Recent studies (Bronson et al. 2011; Schroeder 2015; Marshall et al. 2016) find that new 
audit regulations induced audit firms to take longer to issue their audit reports and that the delay 
in audit reports is greater than the delay in earnings announcements after earnings announcement 
regulation.  As such, the likelihood of a company issuing its year-end earnings announcement prior 
to the completion of the audit increased after the new audit regulations.  Even controlling for 
instances when the audit report date came after the earnings announcement, fiscal year-end 
earnings announcements came more than four days later after regulation than before (𝜔1 = 4.37; p 
< 0.01 from Model 3).  These results, coupled with the evidence from Bronson et al. (2011) and 
Schroeder (2015), indicate that the change in audit report and earnings announcement lags, while 
both influenced by SOX, represent distinct trends.  
 My evidence from the sensitivity analyses, taken together, indicates that the change in 
earnings announcement timing documented in this study resulted from the regulatory changes over 
earnings announcements brought about by SOX.32  I address the question of whether the creation 
of regulatory oversight for earnings announcements altered the informational role of quarterly 
earnings announcements in the next section. 
Changes in the Relative Information Role of Earnings Announcements 
 To examine the change the relative informational role of quarterly earnings announcements 
(abnormal R2) I use both a large sample of firms and the 500 firms selected for hand-collection.   
                                                 
32 To address the concern that my results may be attributable to changing sample composition, I re-perform the 
Table 3 analyses for a constant sample of firms that disclose earnings announcements during the first full year of my 
large sample (1999).  While using a constant firm sub-sample may demonstrate survivorship bias, the basic results 




 To test for a change in the informational role of quarterly earnings announcements 
following the adoption earnings announcement regulation, I examine the change in the abnormal 
R2 measure developed in Ball and Shivakumar (2008) between the pre- and the post-regulation 
periods.  Panel A of Table 6 presents the cross-sectional regression estimates of calendar-year 
returns on the four quarterly earnings announcement window returns (t = -1, 0, +1).  The abnormal 
R2 calculated in both the pre- and post-regulation periods provides a measure of the proportion of 
annual return information captured by the four quarterly earnings announcements.  Each of the 
earnings announcement windows in both the pre- and post- periods has a positive and significant 
(p < 0.01) relation with the annual returns.  The adjusted R2 from the regression is 8.76% (14.23%) 
with an abnormal R2 of 3.98% (9.47%) in the pre-regulation (post-regulation) period.  The increase 
in the abnormal R2 is 5.49% from the pre- to the post-regulation period and the ratio of the post-
regulation to pre-regulation abnormal R2 is 2.38.  I use two alternate approaches to gauge the 
statistical significance of the measured change in abnormal R2: 1) a randomization test; and 2) a 
bootstrap estimation. 
1. Randomization Test.  I first implement a randomization procedure to provide a 
benchmark distribution for the change in abnormal R2.  I randomly assign 4,682 of the 9,724 
observations to a test sample, with the remaining observations assigned to a control sample.  I then 
estimate Equation (3) separately for the test and control samples, calculate the abnormal R2 for 
both regressions and compute the change and ratio of the abnormal R2.  After performing the 
estimations of Equation (3) on 500 sets of randomized firm assignments, I create a distribution of 
abnormal R2 changes and ratios against which to compare the results from Table 6.  The abnormal 
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R2 difference and ratio from Table 6 were greater than 99.8% and 99.6% of the randomized trials, 
indicating significance at the 0.01 level. 
 2. Bootstrapping Test.  Next, I implement a bootstrap approach to the regression model 
estimation.  I randomly select 250 of the sample firms, estimate Equation (3) for these firms in 
both the pre- and post-Reg G periods separately and calculate the change and ratio of the abnormal 
R2 for this sub-sample of firms.  Based on 500 trials of such 250-firm randomly selected sub-
samples, I bootstrap a distribution of abnormal R2 changes.  I find that 351 of the 500 estimates 
(70.2%) of the change in abnormal R2 are positive.  Comparing a success rate of 70.2% with a 
binomial distribution which assumes a 50% rate of positive and negative changes, the increase in 
the relative informational role of earnings announcement is significant at the 0.01 level.  The 
results of the randomization and bootstrapping tests both indicate that the relative informational 
role of quarterly earnings announcements increases after regulation. 
Hand-Collected Sample Firms 
In Panel B of Table 6, I present the cross-sectional regression estimates of calendar-year 
returns on the four quarterly earnings announcement window returns (t = -1, 0, +1) for the sample 
of 500 firms that I hand-collected earnings announcement disclosures.  The adjusted R2 from the 
regression is 5.62% (17.21%) with an abnormal R2 of 0.84% (12.45%) in the pre-regulation (post-
regulation) period.  The increase in the abnormal R2 is 11.61% form the pre- to the post- period 
and the ratio of post- to pre- abnormal R2 is 14.83.  Again, I use a randomization test and a bootstrap 
estimation to gauge the statistical significance of the increase in abnormal R2 around the regulation 
of earnings announcements. 
1. Randomization Test.  I first implement a randomization procedure to provide a 
benchmark distribution for the change in abnormal R2.  I randomly assign 500 of the 1,000 
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observations to a test sample, with the remaining observations assigned to a control sample.  I then 
estimate Equation (3) separately for the test and control samples, calculate the abnormal R2 for 
both regressions and compute the change and ratio of the abnormal R2.  After performing the 
estimations of Equation (3) on 500 sets of randomized firm assignments, I create a distribution of 
abnormal R2 changes and ratios against which to compare the results from Table 7.  The abnormal 
R2 difference and ratio from Table 6 were greater than 99.9% of the randomized trials, indicating 
significance at the 0.01 level. 
 2. Bootstrapping Test.  Next, I implement a bootstrap approach to the regression model 
estimation.  I randomly select 250 of the sample firms, estimate Equation (3) for these firms in 
both the pre- and post-regulation periods separately and calculate the change and ratio of the 
abnormal R2 for this sub-sample of firms.  Based on 200 trials of such 250-firm randomly selected 
sub-samples, I bootstrap a distribution of abnormal R2 changes.  I find that 196 of the 200 estimates 
(98.0%) of the change in abnormal R2 are positive.  Comparing a success rate of 98.0% with a 
binomial distribution which assumes a 50% rate of positive and negative changes, the increase in 
the relative informational role of earnings announcement is significant at the 0.01 level.  The 
results of the randomization and bootstrapping tests for the hand-collected sample firms are 
consistent with the results for the large sample, with earnings announcement dates becoming 
relatively more important to investors after regulation. 
 These results indicate that the relative informational role of quarterly earnings 
announcements increased significantly after their regulation, implying that investors view them as 
more important sources of information under SEC oversight.  The increase in the abnormal R2 
measure after the regulations that I document in this study is consistent with the increase in the 
measure around 2003 – 2004 noted in both Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Basu et al. (2013).  
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My results suggest that, despite the increased time needed to make the announcements, 
shareholders perceived the earnings announcements to be more informative under SEC regulation. 
7. Conclusions 
 SOX instituted regulatory oversight of earnings announcements.  While the SOX 
regulations were not intended to alter the timing of earnings releases, I document evidence that 
indicates a systematic delay in earnings announcements.  By instituting oversight for earnings 
releases through the Form-8-K requirement and creating the PCAOB, SOX introduced 
mechanisms that could potentially influence earnings announcement timing.  I also provide 
evidence that the relative informational role of quarterly earnings announcements increased 
significantly after the regulations were instituted.  These results highlight a tradeoff in the timing 
and importance (i.e., relevance for reliability) of earnings announcements now that they are 
collected by the SEC. 
Prior studies have documented a sustained growth in the informational role of earnings 
announcements from the period around 2003 – 2004, and I provide evidence that the increased 
informational role of earnings announcements can be partially attributed to the regulation.  
Accounting researchers continue to debate the importance of quarterly earnings releases relative 
to other information sources for investors, and my study demonstrates that regulatory intervention 
can increase the importance of earnings announcements (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Basu et 
al. 2013).  These results highlight additional consequences of disclosure regulation likely to be of 
interest to regulators, registrants, investors, auditors and academics. 
This study indicates that any new regulation of the methods for disseminating information 
to investors should consider its impact on the timing of the required disclosures.  The consequences 
of a delay in information should be included in any cost-benefit analysis done for the regulation.  
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For earnings announcement regulation, the benefits to users outweighed the costs of the delay, but 
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Lag The number of calendar days between the fiscal period-end date and the 
report date of quarterly earnings from Compustat. 
RegG An indicator variable that equals one for all earnings announcements made 
on or after March 28, 2003, and zero otherwise. 
NG An indicator variable that equals one if the actual earnings in I/B/E/S does 
not equal the GAAP earnings per share in Compustat (Compustat Quarterly 
item #19 or #9 depending on the I/B/E/S primary or diluted indicator). 
Year-end An indicator variable that equals one if the earnings announcement is for the 
fiscal fourth quarter, zero otherwise. Sales is the natural logarithm of 
quarterly net sales revenue. 
Inventory The ratio of inventory to total assets. 
Surprise The difference between the actual quarterly earnings announced and the 
median analyst estimate (I/B/E/S) scaled by the end of firm-quarter stock 
price. 
Miss An indicator variable that equals one if Surprise is negative, zero otherwise. 
HiTech An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a member of a high-tech 
industry, zero otherwise. 
Intangible Equals total non-current assets other than property, plant and equipment. 
SI An indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports a special item in the 
quarter, zero otherwise. 
MTB The ratio of the firm’s market value of equity to its book value of 
shareholders’ equity. 
MandA An indicator variable that equals one if the firm discloses merger and 
acquisition activities during the quarter, zero otherwise. 
Loss An indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s GAAP earnings are less 
than zero in the current quarter, zero otherwise. 
Leverage The firm’s total liabilities divided by its book value of shareholders’ equity. 
Bath An indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports both a negative 
special item and negative earnings in the quarter, zero otherwise. 
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BIG5 An indicator variable that equals one if the audit opinion is provided by 
Andersen, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG or Deloitte 
(from Audit Analytics), and zero otherwise. 
SOX An indicator variable that equals one if the report date of quarterly earnings 
is after July 30, 2002 but before March 28, 2003, and zero otherwise. 
RegG1 An indicator variable that equals one is the report date of quarterly earnings 
is on or after March 28, 2003 but before November 30, 2004, and zero 
otherwise. 
SOX404 An indicator variable that equals one if the report date of quarterly earnings 
is after November 30, 2004, and zero otherwise. 
PR An indicator variable that equals one if the firm discloses non-GAAP 
earnings in its earnings announcement, zero otherwise. 
IS An indicator variable that equals one if the firm discloses a GAAP income 
statement in its earnings announcement, zero otherwise. 
BS An indicator variable that equals one if the firm discloses a GAAP balance 
sheet in its earnings announcement, zero otherwise. 
CF An indicator variable that equals one if the firm discloses GAAP statement 
of cash flows in its earnings announcement, zero otherwise. 
GC an indicator variable that equals one if the firm a going concern modification 
in the current year (from Audit Analytics), and zero otherwise. 
NotAudited An indicator variable that equals one if the report date of quarterly earnings is 
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Panel A: Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing Sample 
 Firm-Quarters 
Compustat Quarterly File (Jan. 1998 – Dec. 2008)  481,961 
Less: Observations without RDQ33 (91,986) 
Less: RDQ errors (5,307) 
Firms with RDQ and Fiscal Year-end data (15,673 firms) 384,668 
Less: Observations without control variable data (178,282) 
Less: Observations without I/B/E/S analyst forecast data (100,615) 
Timing Tests Sample (7,303 firms) 105,771 
 
Panel B: Change in the Relative Informational Role of Earnings Announcements Sample 
 Firms 
Compustat Quarterly File (Nov. 2001 – Apr. 2004)  8,059 
Less: Firms without RDQ (1,787) 
Less: RDQ errors (52) 
Less: RDQ before Mar. 28, 2002 or after Mar. 27, 2004 (256) 
Less: Firms without all eight earnings announcements (978) 
Less: Observations without CRSP data (124) 
 





                                                 
33 RDQ is the report date of quarterly earnings variable from the Compustat Quarterly database and indicates the 




Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing 
Panel A: Summary Statistics & Univariate Tests 
 
              Pre-Reg G Post-Reg G   
Variable  25th Pctl Mean Median 75th Pctl  Mean Mean t-stat 
Lag  22.00 31.11 28.00 38.00  28.46 32.88 50.55** 
NG  0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00  0.45 0.42 -7.57** 
Year-end  0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00  0.26 0.26 0.35 
Sales  3.44 4.74 4.73 6.02  4.59 4.85 21.45** 
Inv  0.00 0.09 0.03 0.14  0.10 0.09 -19.30** 
Surprise  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 5.59** 
Miss  0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00  0.27 0.32 19.35** 
HiTech  0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00  0.27 0.26 1.03 
Intangible  0.02 0.19 0.14 0.31  0.18 0.20 13.39** 
Special  0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00  0.30 0.37 24.54** 
MTB  1.41 3.14 2.15 3.59  3.22 3.08 -5.62** 
MandA  0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00  0.02 0.05 24.00** 
Loss  0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00  0.28 0.21 -25.90** 
Lev  0.42 2.52 1.07 2.43  2.56 2.49 2.54* 
Bath  0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00  0.11 0.09 13.29** 
Observations   105,771   42,479 63,292   
 
Panel B: Lag Statistics by Fiscal Year and Year-end 
 
Year-end = 0   Year-end = 1 
Year Mean Median N  Year Mean Median N 
1998 24.7 22 73  1998 41.0 39 376 
1999 24.6 24 7,671  1999 39.2 35 2,864 
2000 24.9 24 7,409  2000 37.9 36 2,649 
2001 25.2 24 7,633  2001 38.0 36 2,732 
2002 26.0 24 7,931  2002 38.6 36 2,755 
2003 26.9 27 8,033  2003 43.2 40 2,956 
2004 28.5 27 8,877  2004 45.1 43 3,230 
2005 29.7 28 9,553  2005 46.9 45 3,425 
2006 30.8 31 9,974  2006 45.6 44 3,531 
2007 31.2 31 10,343  2007 46.2 45 3,139 





Panel C: Variable Correlation Coefficients 
 
  Lag RegG NG 
Year-
end Sales Inventory Surprise Miss HiTech Intangible Special MTB MandA Loss Leverage Bath 
Lag -- 0.16 0.04 0.48 -0.18 -0.03 -0.14 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.19 -0.15 0.11 
RegG 0.19 -- 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 
NG 0.05 0.02 -- 0.06 0.19 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.37 -0.03 0.10 0.11 -0.04 0.23 
Year-end 0.40 0.00 0.06 -- 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.07 
Sales -0.16 0.07 0.19 0.01 -- 0.18 0.05 -0.11 -0.31 0.17 0.19 -0.05 0.08 -0.36 0.09 -0.07 
Inventory -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.24 -- -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 -0.02 
Surprise -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -- -0.45 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.21 -0.02 -0.17 
Miss 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.79 -- -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.20 0.03 0.12 
HiTech 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.30 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -- 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.03 0.25 -0.24 0.11 
Intangible 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.19 0.11 0.00 -0.04 0.19 -- 0.19 0.01 0.08 0.04 -0.24 0.10 
Special 0.07 0.07 0.37 0.11 0.19 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.21 -- -0.03 0.22 0.14 -0.03 0.46 
MTB -0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 0.21 0.10 -0.04 -- -0.02 0.01 0.16 -0.04 
MandA -0.01 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.00 -- -0.01 0.03 0.07 
Loss 0.18 -0.08 0.11 0.03 -0.34 -0.07 -0.13 0.20 0.25 0.07 0.14 -0.09 -0.01 -- -0.13 0.58 
Leverage -0.12 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.33 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 -0.37 -0.25 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.18 -- -0.05 
Bath 0.10 -0.04 0.23 0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.46 -0.11 0.07 0.58 -0.05 -- 
 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
** and * indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. Also indicates significant results for Wilcoxon two-sample tests of median differences at the 
0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively.  
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented above (below) the diagonal in Panel B.  
Correlation coefficients significant at the 0.01 level are shown in bold.  




Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing 
 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 + 𝛼2𝑃𝐹 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝑃𝐹 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑








  Predicted   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
Variables Sign  Coefficient T-Stat  Coefficient T-Stat  Coefficient T-Stat 
Intercept   30.80 5.43***  30.83 38.52***  32.16 39.88*** 
RegG +     2.39 4.82***  1.71 3.44*** 
NG +  0.73 5.43***  0.72 5.42***  0.62 3.62*** 
RegG × NG +/-        0.20 1.02 
Year-end +  14.75 91.26***  14.75 91.13***  13.17 68.95*** 
RegG × Year-end +        2.56 13.84*** 
Sales   -1.34 -21.12***  -1.34 -21.13***  -1.34 -21.14*** 
Inventory   2.73 3.29***  2.76 3.32***  2.74 3.30*** 
Surprise   -72.41 -14.34***  -72.22 -14.33***  -72.48 -14.33*** 
Miss   1.50 13.67***  1.50 13.67***  1.48 13.56*** 
HiTech   -1.94 -6.71***  -1.93 -6.69***  -1.93 -6.68*** 
Intangible   5.17 9.78***  5.17 9.79***  5.16 9.78*** 
Special   0.30 2.03**  0.30 2.04**  0.31 2.09** 
MTB   -0.05 -2.59**  -0.05 -2.61***  -0.06 -2.65*** 
MandA   -1.68 -5.41***  -1.68 -5.42***  -1.73 -5.57*** 
Loss   3.26 14.39***  3.26 14.40***  3.27 14.43*** 
Leverage   -0.38 -14.27***  -0.38 -14.27***  -0.38 -14.23*** 
Bath   -0.82 -3.44***  -0.83 -3.46***  -0.79 -3.29*** 
           
Fixed-Effects   Year  Year  Year 
R-Squared     36.04%   36.07%   36.23% 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors (White 1980) clustered by firm and Year-
end.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 




Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing – Additional Timeframes 
 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝑋 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑂𝑋404 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑂𝑋 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺1 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑂𝑋404 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔5







    Model 1   Model 2   
Variables  Coefficient T-Stat  Coefficient T-Stat  
Intercept  36.43 49.16***  36.36 49.16***  
SOX  2.67 12.61***  2.87 12.18***  
RegG1  5.07 7.84***  4.47 6.91***  
SOX404  9.83 11.77***  11.16 12.11***  
Year-end  13.56 57.00***  13.60 46.00***  
SOX × Year-end     -0.56 -1.50  
RegG1 × Year-end     1.41 4.57***  
SOX404 × Year-end     -2.27 -4.89***  
Big5  -4.67 -7.88***  -4.65 -7.85***  
        
Controls  Yes  Yes  
Fixed-Effects  Year  Year  
R-Squared   35.81%   35.97%   
 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors (White 1980) clustered by firm.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 






TABLE 5  
Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing – Sensitivity Analyses 
Panel A: Hand-Collected Sample 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 + 𝜃2𝑃𝑅 + 𝜃3𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝑃𝑅 + 𝐼𝑆 + 𝜃4𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝐼𝑆 + 𝜃5𝐵𝑆 + 𝜃6𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝐵𝑆 + 𝜃7𝐶𝐹 + 𝜃8𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝐶𝐹
+ 𝜃9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜃10𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +
𝑖=22
𝑖=11
𝜀, (2)  
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables  Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Intercept  30.86 12.50*** 30.00 10.88 31.25 12.20*** 31.40 12.82*** 29.52 10.43*** 
RegG  1.69 2.42** 1.53 0.62 1.51 1.90* 1.37 1.99** 1.86 0.74 
PR  0.28 0.37       0.32 0.43 
RegG × PR  -1.10 -1.44       -1.19 -1.54 
IS    1.15 0.78     1.45 0.92 
RegG × IS    -0.11 -0.05     -0.24 -0.10 
BS      -0.25 -0.31   0.45 0.51 
RegG × BS      -0.09 -0.14   -0.01 -0.02 
CF        -3.63 -3.43*** -3.85 -3.46*** 
RegG × CF        1.38 1.53 1.46 1.54 
Year-end  11.23 18.52*** 11.23 18.57*** 11.23 18.53*** 11.31 18.71*** 11.30 18.71*** 
RegG × Year-end  0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.18 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.01 
            
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed-Effects  Year Year Year Year Year 
R-Squared   25.61% 25.60% 25.58% 26.48% 26.60% 
 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors (White 1980) clustered by firm and Year-end. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
The sample consists of the 2,000 hand-collected firm-quarter earnings announcement observations.  
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Panel B: Including Auditor Opinion Data 
 
𝐿𝑎𝑔 =  𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 + 𝜔2𝑃𝐹 + 𝜔3𝑅𝑒𝑔𝐺 × 𝑃𝐹 + 𝜔4𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝜔5𝐵𝐼𝐺5 + 𝜔6𝐺𝐶







    Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
Variables  Coefficient T-Stat  Coefficient T-Stat  Coefficient T-Stat 
Intercept  46.31 8.77***  47.84 11.21***  47.63 11.16*** 
RegG  6.60 5.04***  4.41 3.32***  4.37 3.32*** 
NG  0.51 1.26  1.04 2.59**  1.05 2.63*** 
RegG × NG  0.62 1.40  0.36 0.84  0.35 0.81 
Restate  1.19 2.17**  0.90 1.67*  0.93 1.73* 
Big5  -3.85 -6.17***  2.76 2.83***  -2.83 -4.88*** 
GC  13.84 9.90***     13.38 10.78*** 
NotAudited     1.28 9.81***  -8.91 -28.67*** 
          
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed-Effects  Year  Year  Year 
R-Squared   25.60%   30.13%   30.71% 
 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors (White 1980) clustered by firm and Year-
end.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 





Change in the Relative Informational Role of Earnings Announcements  
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤1) + 𝜃2𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤2) + 𝜃3𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤3)
+ 𝜃4𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤4) + 𝜀 
 
    Pre-Reg G   Post-Reg G 
  Coefficient T-stat  Coefficient T-stat 
Intercept  -0.10 -5.38***  -0.03 -5.35*** 
Ri(Window1) 0.97 11.40***  1.23 15.19*** 
Ri(Window2) 0.79 11.71***  0.93 14.55*** 
Ri(Window3) 0.16 7.07***  0.62 9.51*** 
Ri(Window4) 0.52 10.91**  1.19 15.02*** 
       
Adjusted R2  8.76%  14.23% 
Abnormal R2 3.98%   9.47% 
Abnormal R2 DifferenceA 5.49%*** 
Abnormal R2 RatioA 2.38*** 
Abnormal R2 IncreasesB 70.2%*** 
 
The dependent variable is the calendar-year buy-and-hold returns from March 28, 2002 (2003) through March 27, 
2003 (2004) for the Pre-Reg G (Post-Reg G) period. The independent variables are the three-day buy-and-hold returns 
for the four earnings announcement days during the calendar year (days t -1 through t +1).  The abnormal R2 is the 
adjusted R2 from the regression adjusted for the expected adjusted R2 under the hypothesis that daily returns are i.i.d. 
across time.  
A The significance of Abnormal R2 Difference (Ratio) based on 500 randomized Abnormal R2 Differences (Ratios) 
calculated from the sample of hand-collected earning announcements. 
B Abnormal R2 Increases is based on a bootstrapped distribution of abnormal R2 changes from random samples of 250 
firms from the pre- to the post-Reg G period (500 trials). Significance is based on the success rate of a positive change 
compared to a binomial distribution. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
The sample includes 4,682 firms with the necessary stock return data from CRSP and earnings announcement dates 






Panel B: Hand-Collected Sample 
 
𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤1) + 𝜃2𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤2) + 𝜃3𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤3)
+ 𝜃4𝑅𝑖(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤4) + 𝜀 
 
    Pre-Reg G   Post-Reg G 
  Coefficient T-stat  Coefficient T-stat 
Intercept  -0.10 -5.72***  -0.09 -5.88*** 
Ri(Window1) 0.97 4.04***  0.58 2.79*** 
Ri(Window2) 0.79 3.36***  1.01 6.85*** 
Ri(Window3) 0.16 0.60  0.59 3.63*** 
Ri(Window4) 0.52 2.13**  1.25 6.10*** 
       
Adjusted R2  5.62%  17.21% 
Abnormal R2 0.84%   12.45% 
Abnormal R2 DifferenceA 11.61%*** 
Abnormal R2 RatioA 14.83*** 
Abnormal R2 IncreasesB 98.0%*** 
 
The dependent variable is the calendar-year buy-and-hold returns from March 28, 2002 (2003) through March 27, 
2003 (2004) for the Pre-Reg G (Post-Reg G) period. The independent variables are the three-day buy-and-hold returns 
for the four earnings announcement days during the calendar year (days t -1 through t +1).  The abnormal R2 is the 
adjusted R2 from the regression adjusted for the expected adjusted R2 under the hypothesis that daily returns are i.i.d 
across time as in Ball and Shivakumar (2008). The sample includes the 500 firms chosen for the hand-collections 
sample, with one observation for the calendar year prior to and subsequent to Reg G’s enactment date. 
A The significance of Abnormal R2 Difference (Ratio) based on 500 randomized Abnormal R2 Differences (Ratios) 
calculated from the sample of hand-collected earning announcements. 
B Abnormal R2 Increases is based on a bootstrapped distribution of abnormal R2 changes from random samples of 250 
firms from the pre- to the post-Reg G period (200 trials). The significance is based on the success rate of a positive 
change compared to a binomial distribution. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
 
